Turkmenistan's Fuel Paradox and the Emerging Energy Risk for Central Asia

Turkmenistan's Fuel Paradox and the Emerging Energy Risk for Central Asia Analytical Brief by the Dayanç Human Rights Platform / Turkmenistan Central Asia is entering a period of growing energy vulnerability. Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refining infrastructure, restrictions on exports of Russian petroleum products, rising fuel prices, and supply disruptions are already affecting countries across the region, many of which remain dependent on Russian gasoline, diesel fuel, and aviation kerosene. Turkmenistan's situation, however, differs fundamentally from that of countries without significant domestic hydrocarbon resources. Turkmenistan extracts crude oil, refines it, and exports petroleum products. Nevertheless, for several years its population has faced persistent shortages of gasoline and diesel fuel, while the country's civil aviation sector has repeatedly experienced shortages of aviation kerosene. For this reason, the current regional energy crisis should not be viewed solely as a consequence of external geopolitical developments. In Turkmenistan's case, it threatens to exacerbate long-standing domestic structural problems arising from opaque planning, excessive centralization, export-oriented priorities, and the absence of an effective mechanism for rapidly reallocating fuel supplies when circumstances change. A Region Dependent on Russian Petroleum Products In an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty published by Azattyq Asia on 9 July 2026, Professor Luca Anceschi of the University of Glasgow warned that continued attacks on Russia's oil refining infrastructure could have serious consequences for all of Central Asia. According to Professor Anceschi, the most immediate consequences are likely to include: higher prices for gasoline, diesel fuel, and aviation kerosene; rising transportation costs; increased agricultural production costs; higher food prices and more expensive consumer goods; declining purchasing power; and growing social tensions. Professor Anceschi emphasizes that the impact will not be evenly distributed. Kazakhstan possesses substantial domestic resources and refining capacity, while Uzbekistan also has greater room to maneuver. Nevertheless, if the situation continues to deteriorate, energy vulnerability will increase across the entire region. Agriculture is particularly exposed because it depends heavily on diesel fuel. Planting, harvesting, irrigation, and the transportation of agricultural products all require stable fuel supplies. Consequently, an energy crisis can quickly evolve into a food security crisis. Professor Anceschi also points to the absence of an effective regional mechanism for collective energy security in Central Asia. Instead of developing an integrated regional energy market and coordinated infrastructure, governments continue to rely primarily on temporary bilateral arrangements. Turkmenistan: An Oil-Producing Country Without Fuel Against this regional backdrop, Turkmenistan presents a striking paradox. According to an investigation published by Turkmen.news on 6 July 2026, shortages of gasoline and diesel fuel have persisted throughout the country for several years. While the problem may be less visible in Ashgabat, residents of the country's regions and remote districts continue to face long queues at petrol stations and, in some cases, have resorted to appealing directly to the President for assistance. The publication reports that in August 2025, Polat Berdyev, a resident of the village of Etrek in Balkan Province, sent a telegram to President Serdar Berdimuhamedov complaining about the shortage of AI-95 gasoline and requesting government intervention. According to the publication's sources, the shortage has continued into 2026 and is no longer limited to Balkan Province. These reports suggest that the fuel shortage is not an isolated or temporary disruption but rather a chronic structural problem. In Turkmenistan, the extraction, refining, distribution, and export of petroleum products are all controlled by the state. Production targets, distribution quotas, and pricing policies are centrally approved, including at the presidential level. Such a system leaves very little flexibility to respond quickly when demand changes or supply chains are disrupted. According to sources cited by Turkmen.news, government officials are reluctant to assume responsibility for revising previously approved production and distribution plans. As a result, even relatively minor disruptions within an already rigid supply chain can escalate into major crises. Aviation Fuel: Official Documents Reveal the Scale of the Problem Particularly alarming information concerns the supply of aviation kerosene. An internal letter published by Turkmen.news from the management of Ashgabat International Airport, dated 2024, stated that as of 3 June the airport had approximately 2,500 tonnes of TS-1 aviation fuel remaining. With average daily consumption estimated at around 700 tonnes, those reserves were expected to last only two to three days. The document further stated that the fuel depot in Annau had failed to supply aviation fuel on schedule. Airport management warned that continued shortages could affect flight safety and disrupt scheduled operations. Later, in December 2024, another official communication reported that average daily fuel consumption had increased to approximately 850 tonnes, while the airport's remaining fuel reserves had fallen to only 728 tonnes—less than one day's operational requirement. Although scheduled flights were apparently not suspended at that time, the underlying causes of the shortage were not resolved. Instead, the crisis was managed manually through correspondence between government agencies and the ad hoc redistribution of available fuel supplies. According to Turkmen.news, in June 2026 the aviation authorities once again appealed to the state concern Turkmennebit and Turkmennebitönümleri, requesting that part of the July aviation fuel allocation originally designated for other airports be redirected to Ashgabat. At the time of publication, no official response had reportedly been received. The Numbers That Do Not Add Up Particular attention should be paid to the relationship between officially reported production figures and the country's actual fuel requirements. According to official government statements, Turkmenistan refined approximately 4.96 million tonnes of crude oil in 2025, producing 434,000 tonnes of aviation kerosene, representing an increase of 5.4% compared to the previous year. This indicates that approximately 411,800 tonnes of aviation fuel were produced in 2024. However, the annual fuel requirement of Ashgabat International Airport alone, based on an average daily consumption of 850 tonnes, amounts to approximately 310,000 tonnes per year. In addition to Ashgabat, Turkmenistan operates airports in Turkmenbashi, Balkanabat, Kerki, Turkmenabat, Mary, and Dashoguz. Aviation fuel is also required by military aviation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Border Service, and other state institutions. According to figures published by Turkmen.news, approximately 320,000 tonnes of aviation fuel were allocated for domestic consumers in 2026. Of this amount, 298,000 tonnes were designated for civilian airports, while 21,700 tonnes were reserved as the strategic fuel reserve of the Turkmenhowayollary Agency. Even without taking into account all regional airports, government aircraft, military aviation, emergency operations, and unforeseen circumstances, these volumes appear insufficient when compared with the operational requirements of Ashgabat International Airport alone. This suggests that the problem extends beyond production capacity. The central issue concerns how aviation fuel is allocated between domestic consumers, government institutions, strategic reserves, and export markets. When Export Becomes More Profitable Than Domestic Supply Turkmen.news also highlights the significant disparity between the domestic and international value of aviation fuel. According to the publication, the state receives from the national aviation agency only 27.74 manats per tonne of aviation kerosene—equivalent to less than US$1.50 per tonne. By contrast, the international market price of TS-1 aviation fuel is reported to be approximately US$930 per tonne. Although Turkmenistan does not publicly disclose the total volume of aviation fuel exports, information concerning individual export contracts and destinations suggests that tens of thousands of tonnes are exported annually. Such a pricing structure creates an obvious economic incentive to prioritize exports over domestic supply. This does not mean that exports alone explain the country's fuel shortages. Other contributing factors may include outdated infrastructure, transportation bottlenecks, storage limitations, inefficient logistics, losses, corruption, or fuel diversion. Nevertheless, in the absence of transparent production statistics and publicly available allocation quotas, it is impossible to determine independently how much of Turkmenistan's aviation fuel actually reaches domestic consumers. An External Crisis Meets Internal Structural Weaknesses Unlike Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, Turkmenistan possesses its own hydrocarbon resources. Consequently, it may appear less vulnerable to disruptions affecting Russian petroleum exports. However, domestic oil production does not automatically guarantee energy security. First, regional instability may increase international demand for Turkmen petroleum products. As prices rise across neighboring countries, exporting fuel becomes increasingly profitable. Second, neighboring states may seek additional supplies from Turkmenistan to compensate for shortages elsewhere. Without transparent mechanisms balancing domestic needs and export commitments, increased exports could further reduce fuel availability within the country. Third, the highly centralized decision-making system offers little public oversight regarding fuel production, distribution, or reserve management. As a result, society has no reliable means of assessing whether sufficient fuel is being produced, where it is being distributed, or why shortages persist despite officially reported increases in production. In this context, the regional energy crisis should not be viewed as the primary cause of Turkmenistan's fuel shortages. Rather, it has the potential to intensify pre-existing structural weaknesses within the country's system of governance. Consequences for the Population Fuel shortages affect far more than the ability to fill a vehicle's fuel tank. For Turkmenistan, the consequences may include: rising transportation costs for both passengers and freight; higher prices for food and agricultural products; increasing hardship for residents of remote regions who rely heavily on road transport; greater risks to domestic and international air transportation, including flight delays, schedule disruptions, and possible service reductions; expansion of informal fuel markets, corruption, and preferential access to scarce resources; growing public dissatisfaction as the contrast widens between official claims of economic success and the everyday reality experienced by citizens. Professor Luca Anceschi notes that prolonged increases in energy prices eventually reduce household purchasing power and raise the overall cost of living. Historical experience in several countries demonstrates that persistent energy crises can contribute to broader social instability. Turkmenistan may prove particularly vulnerable because fuel shortages have already become a recurring domestic problem rather than an isolated emergency. The Problem Is Not a Lack of Resources The central conclusion of this analysis is that Turkmenistan is facing not a resource deficit, but a governance deficit. The country possesses significant oil reserves, functioning refineries, and the capacity to produce substantial volumes of petroleum products. Yet ordinary citizens, regional communities, and even strategically important sectors continue to experience recurring fuel shortages. A system in which annual production plans are approved at the highest political level but cannot be adjusted quickly in response to changing circumstances creates structural vulnerability. Responsibility is dispersed among state agencies, decisions are made manually through bureaucratic correspondence, and key production and distribution data remain inaccessible to the public. Under such conditions, higher production figures do not necessarily translate into greater fuel availability for domestic consumers. The evidence examined in this analysis indicates that the challenge is not simply how much fuel Turkmenistan produces, but how that fuel is managed, allocated, and prioritized. What Needs to Change To reduce the risk of future fuel shortages and strengthen national energy security, the authorities of Turkmenistan should: 1. Publish comprehensive and verifiable statistics on the production, domestic consumption, export, and strategic reserves of gasoline, diesel fuel, and aviation kerosene. 2. Disclose annual allocation quotas and explain how petroleum products are distributed among civilian consumers, regional administrations, airports, state institutions, security agencies, and export markets. 3. Guarantee strategic fuel reserves sufficient to ensure the uninterrupted operation of civil aviation, agriculture, emergency services, and regional transportation. 4. Introduce flexible planning mechanisms allowing fuel allocation to be adjusted promptly in response to changing operational needs rather than requiring intervention at the highest political level. 5. Conduct an independent audit of production losses, logistical inefficiencies, fuel diversion, corruption risks, and inventory management throughout the petroleum sector. 6. Prioritize domestic supply during periods of shortage, ensuring that the basic needs of the population and essential public services are met before expanding exports. 7. Provide timely public information regarding supply disruptions and the measures being taken to address them instead of withholding information until shortages become critical. 8. Strengthen regional energy cooperation with neighboring Central Asian states by supporting transparent mechanisms for energy security, emergency fuel reserves, and coordinated crisis response. Conclusion The emerging fuel crisis in Central Asia may become one of the region's most significant economic challenges in the coming years. However, Turkmenistan illustrates a deeper and more fundamental problem. Despite being an oil-producing state with domestic refining capacity, the country has repeatedly failed to guarantee stable fuel supplies for its own population and strategically important infrastructure. Professor Luca Anceschi's analysis demonstrates that Central Asia requires greater diversification, stronger infrastructure, and long-term regional planning to withstand external shocks. The materials published by Turkmen.news, together with the official correspondence from the Turkmenhowayollary Agency, suggest that Turkmenistan continues to face serious challenges in the transparent management and distribution of petroleum products within the country. As long as export revenues, opaque allocation quotas, and rigid centralized planning take precedence over the practical needs of citizens, any external disruption to regional energy markets is likely to intensify domestic shortages. The issue facing Turkmenistan is not the absence of oil or fuel. Rather, it is the absence of transparency regarding how much fuel is produced, where it is allocated, how distribution decisions are made, and why an oil-producing nation continues to experience recurring shortages of gasoline, diesel fuel, and aviation kerosene. Addressing these questions through greater transparency, accountability, and evidence-based governance would not only strengthen national energy security but also improve public confidence in the country's institutions. --- Sources 1. Turkmen.news. "Fuel Shortages Persist in Oil-Producing Turkmenistan" (6 July 2026). https://turkmen.news/2026/07/06/v-neftedobyvayushem-turkmenistane-ostro-ne-hvataet-topliva/ 2. Azattyq Asia / Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. "A Turning Point: Why Attacks on Russian Oil Refineries Affect Central Asia and What Comes Next" (9 July 2026). https://www.azattyqasia.org/a/pochemu-ataki-vsu-na-rossiyskie-npz-byut-po-tsentralnoy-azii-i-chto-budet-dalshe/33799271.html 3. Official correspondence of the Turkmenhowayollary Agency and Ashgabat International Airport concerning aviation fuel supplies in 2024–2026, as reproduced in the Turkmen.news investigation. 4. Production figures, allocation data, pricing information, and export-related estimates referenced in this article are based on the above-mentioned publications. Due to the limited transparency of official statistics in Turkmenistan, some data cannot be independently verified through publicly available government sources.